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Clinicians see Bayesian and frequentist analysis in published research papers, and need a basic
understanding of both. A repeated measures data set was analyzed using both approaches. Assumptions
underlying each method and conclusions reached were contrasted. The Bayesian approach is a viable
alternative to frequentist statistical analysis for many clinical projects.
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Introduction

Methodology

Classical or frequentist statistics is the standard
method of analysis in clinical research. There is
another statistical option, Bayesian analysis,
with advocates arguing that it can be equally or
more suited to the analysis of clinical research
problems. In recent years increasing numbers of
studies have appeared using Bayesian analysis
or a combination of Bayesian and frequentist
analyses, making it likely that health care
clinicians will encounter papers written using a
Bayesian approach, and that students will need
some exposure to both methods. The purpose of
this article is to compare the analysis and
interpretation of a simple clinical data set using
Bayesian and frequentist approaches as a
simplified introduction to the Bayesian approach
for clinicians without a background in statistics.

Bayesian analysis has developed from the work
of Thomas Bayes, an eighteenth century British
Presbyterian minister with an interest in
probability theory (Brooks, 2001). His theorem
is used in predicting probability. In itself, it is
uncontroversial and commonly used in areas
such as Mendelian genetics and computerized
diagnosis (Lilford & Braunholtz, 1996). For
such purposes it is used by statisticians of all
backgrounds (Lee, 1989/1992). The application
of Bayesian analysis in a broader sense is the
source of debate and controversy. An
explanation of some of the basic assumptions in
these cases may help clarify why there is such
heated debate.
Bayesian methods essentially construct
probability distributions for unknown quantities
of interest given the data, for example the
probability that a particular Treatment A is
superior to Treatment B given data from a trial.
This probability is termed the posterior
distribution and then used to reach conclusions
about the research question. But in Bayesian
analysis researchers are required to estimate a
prior distribution for the event of interest in
order to run the analysis of a data set. This prior
distribution may be based on a variety of
external evidence that includes controlled and
uncontrolled studies, case reports, and expert
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opinions. When comparing the two treatments
mentioned above, the prior distribution is the
probability that Treatment A is superior to
Treatment B based on available information
before data is collected. The actual data gathered
in the study is considered the likelihood.
To state the application of Bayes
Theorem in simplistic terms, the posterior
probability distribution is proportional to the
likelihood of the collected data multiplied by the
prior distribution. The likelihood function and
the prior function are combined into a
distribution summing to 1 to create the posterior
probability. All inferences about treatment
difference are based on the posterior
distribution. With continued data collection, it is
possible later to revise the analysis and
determine a new (and hopefully more precise)
posterior distribution to use in conclusions
regarding the superiority of Treatment A.
Logically, accumulating evidence would
ultimately also change the prior - moving it to a
more realistic representation of reality. This
updating of the prior distribution occurs as
understanding of the phenomenon of interest
changes in light of the evidence gathered.
Described in these terms the Bayesian
approach has a commonsense appeal: it is
possible to give probabilities, integrate
information from multiple sources, and revise
conclusions in light of new information. The
process follows the classical model of scientific
thinking
and
experimentation
and
is
consequently attractive to those trained in the
scientific method. Proponents of Bayesian
analysis in clinical trials have argued that this
makes it flexible and ethical, well suited for
subgroup analysis, and offers a good option for
ongoing analysis over the course of a trial
(Spiegelhalter, Myles, Jones, & Abrams, 1999).
But an acceptable determination of prior
distribution is one of the hardest things to do in
complex situations, for example when there are
conflicting opinions or studies or multiple
subgroups to be considered. The incorporation
of prior distributions is simultaneously
considered the greatest flaw and greatest
strength of Bayesian analysis, depending on
one’s perspective (O’Hagen, Luce & Fryback,
2003; Spiegelhalter et al. 1999). Bayesian
calculations have also typically required
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complex statistical computation power not
readily accessible to most clinical researchers.
Bayesian statisticians are working on
guidelines for weighting the prior distribution,
with skeptical priors being useful if there are
important reasons for caution (such as risks or
costs of the new treatment), weak priors used
when little is known, and optimistic priors being
used at selected other times. Guidelines for prior
specification are beginning to appear (Kadane,
& Wolfson, 1996; Spiegelhalter et al. 1999). It is
also possible to use a non-informative or
uniform prior which essentially lets the data
speak for itself (Box & Taio, 1973; Lee,
1989/1992). The data can of course be analyzed
with a variety of priors for subsequent decision
making, and indeed data can be collected before
knowing the prior, but this demonstrates
somewhat sloppy and unscientific thinking. If
well done the process should follow the
scientific model - the different priors resemble
competing hypotheses which are to be tested by
examining the data.
The approach in frequentist statistics is
philosophically quite different. Probability is
viewed as “a limiting ratio in a sequence of
repeatable events . . . the ratio becoming ever
more exact as the series is extended” (Howie,
2002, p. 1). Data is interpreted using statistical
models based on frequencies, with the p-value
being a measure of “discrepancy between the
data and the null hypothesis” (Goodman, 1999,
p. 997). This is very different from the Bayesian
view of probability being a degree of belief or
knowledge about the unknown. Contrary to
common misinterpretations, the p-value does not
give the probability of Treatment A being
superior to Treatment B, but instead a
predetermined level of significance test, set by
balancing Type I and Type II errors, that allows
acceptance or rejection of the data set based on
its compatibility with the null hypothesis. The
data are analyzed independently, without the
influence of previous knowledge in the analysis,
although previous knowledge is of use in
planning the data collection. In other words, the
classical inference methods treat parameters as
constants, while Bayesian methods treat them as
random variables.
A frequentist statistician would argue
that the introduction of the prior in Bayesian
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analysis introduces an element of subjectivity
that is unacceptable. A Bayesian may counter
that the decision to rank Type II errors as less
important than Type I and to arbitrarily select a
significance level is unscientific. A frequentist
statistician may weight multiple tests of
variables to reduce the risk of Type I error,
selecting a technique for this from a variety of
more or less accepted methods. A Bayesian
would view an analysis that is more skeptical of
Treatment A because you are also looking at
other treatments or subgroups as ridiculous. It
also could be argued that in frequentist analysis
based on sampling, the analysis is only of value
if the researcher has chosen the appropriate
statistical model and if the data set fits all the
assumptions of the chosen model.
If these conditions are not met, classical
analysis can act to distort interpretation and the
restrictions imposed by the model can exclude
relevant information. Goodwin (1999) gave an
excellent summary and explanation of issues
relating to the use of frequentist and Bayesian
analyses in health research.
The result of either type of analysis in
uncomplicated
situations
where
model
assumptions are similar and where noninformative priors are used often leads to
conclusions that are not much different, but at
other times this may not be true. It is possible to
reach very different conclusions from the same
data set. For a general discussion of Bayesian
and frequentist statistics with an emphasis on
medical research see Matthews (2001a) and
related discussion and response (Berger, 2001;
Lindley, 2001; Matthews, 2001b; Sasieni, 2001),
and an editorial and related articles in the Annals
of Internal Medicine (Davidoff, 1999; Goodman,
1999). Specific illustrations of how Bayesian
analysis can be useful in clinical trials are also
readily located (Johns & Anderson, 1999;
Lilford, 1999; Simon, 1999).
Problem to be Analyzed
The data set used in this article was
generated as part of a student research project.
As such it has been analyzed conventionally and
prepared for journal submission. This exercise
will not give study details but merely use the
data set to illustrate Bayesian and frequentist
approaches to data analysis and interpretation.

The study examined the short-term
effect of a single stretching session on joint
range of motion (ROM). Fifteen experimental
group subjects were given the treatment
(stretch). Measurements were taken at baseline,
and at 1, 3,6,15 and 30 minutes post-stretch.
Fifteen control group subjects were measured at
similar time periods but not subjected to the
treatment.
The question of interest was whether the
stretching procedure altered the ROM at each of
these time points and, if so, whether the stretch
altered it more than the process of being
measured.
It was expected that the six
measurements of ROM required in the protocol
would affect ROM of the control group, but to a
lesser extent. A comparison of the control and
experimental groups would therefore be
expected to show whether the stretch had any
additional effect on ROM. Although Bayesian
analysis has analogs to frequentist tests that
produce p-values, it was decided to examine
90% confidence intervals and their analogous
Bayesian probability intervals.
Results
SPSS for Windows, version 10.1 was used. For
each group the baseline was used as an initial
reference point with subsequent measures
expressed as the difference from this point with
the baseline measured being zero. A repeated
measures General Linear Model (GLM) analysis
was performed with time of measurement as the
within subjects factor and group assignment
(control vs. experimental) as between subject
factor. This analytical model assumes that the
measurements are drawn from a normally
distributed population and that the different
groups have homogeneous variances.
The p-value for testing no difference in the
mean change of ROM between the control and
experimental groups is 0.000, which leads to the
conclusion that there is a difference. Based on
the 90% confidence intervals for the estimated
mean changes over the time, it is clear that the
experimental group performs better than the
control group because none of the 90% intervals
overlap between groups. These are expressed in
Tables 1 and 2, and illustrated graphically in
Figure 1.
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Table 1: Control group change in measurement
from Baseline (Frequentist).

Baseline

Mean

90% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

0

-

-

One minute

1.33

-0.55

3.22

Three minutes

2.27

0.48

4.06

Six minutes

2.67

1.08

4.26

Nine minutes

2.67

0.94

4.39

Fifteen minutes

2.13

0.4

3.86

Thirty minutes

1.87

-0.46

4.2

the raw scores for them (and so the error terms)
are normally distributed. It is also assumed that
that error terms have a mean of zero and a
common variance, and that error terms between
and within the groups are not related. These
assumptions are based on random assignment of
subjects.
Figure 1: 90% Confidence Intervals Using
Frequentist Analysis.
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Table 2: Experimental group change
measurement from Baseline (Frequentist).
Time of
Measurement

Mean
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90% Confidence
Interval

0

Lower
Bound
-

Upper
Bound
-

One minute

10.27

8.25

12.28

Three minutes

12.33

10.08

14.59

Six minutes

14.93

12.42

17.44

Nine minutes

14.33

11.88

16.79

Fifteen minutes

12.53

9.66

15.4

Thirty minutes

13.73

10.95

16.52

Baseline

e
e
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m
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It is possible to state with reasonable
confidence that that the data gathered represent
the underlying state of affairs. Thus, it could be
concluded that the stretch produced an alteration
in range of motion that is greater than that
caused by the measurement technique.
There is, however, reason to be
concerned about the analysis. The statistical
model rests on a number of assumptions. If these
assumptions are violated there is less faith in the
conclusions. It is assumed subjects are a random
sample from a pool of suitable subjects and that

In addition there is a complex
assumption known as the sphericity assumption
related to variances in the fixed factor of the
design. The general linear model procedure tests
for sphericity using Mauchley’s test. In this
sample, the test concluded that the assumption
was not met. This interpretation was based on
using the conservative Greenhouse-Geiser
adjustment.
Analysis with Bayesian Statistics
As with most Bayesian analyses, the
choice of a prior distribution was critical. In this
case there was limited previous evidence to use
in creating a prior distribution. Published studies
using the particular technique studied did not use
the same joints, protocol or exact technique.
Clinical experience suggested that there would
be a modest increase in range in the
experimental group that might or might not
decline over the 30 minute period. Experienced
clinicians could not offer more specific ideas
about the effect of this single stretch treatment.
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This limited evidence made it appropriate to use
a non-informed prior distribution in the analysis.
The analysis was done using Gibbs
sampling, a technique commonly used in
Bayesian analysis. Gibbs sampling is a variant
of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
analyses. This computer intensive technique
provides researchers with repeated random data
points drawn form the statistical distribution of
interest. Parameters of interest are estimated by
repeated iterations of the process until estimates
converge. Gibbs sampling helps compensate for
small data sets such as those generated in this
experiment. For additional information on the
Gibbs sampling technique see Casella and
George (1992).
WinBUGS version 1.3 was used in the
analysis adapting a dynamic model used in
repeated measure research and described in
Congdon (2001). The software program is
available through the Bayesian inference Using
Gibbs
Sampling
(BUGS)
project
http://www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/bugs/).
Again,
baseline measures were converted to zero and
subsequent measures to differences from
baseline. Bayesian means and 90% probability
intervals were calculated. These are presented in
Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 2.

Table 3: Control group change in measurement
from Baseline (Bayesian).
Time of
Measurement

Mean

90% Probability
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

Baseline

0.21

-1.25

1.64

One minute

1.28

0.13

2.47

Three minutes

2.07

0.9

3.26

Six minutes

2.45

1.32

3.62

Nine minutes

2.45

1.37

3.67

Fifteen minutes

2.19

1.04

3.32

Thirty minutes

1.96

0.53

3.38

Table 4: Experimental group change in
measurement from Baseline (Bayesian).
Time of
Measurement

90% Probability
Interval

Mean

Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

Baseline

0.6

-1.57

2.9

One minute

9.35

7.25

11.36

Three minutes

12.64

10.76

14.56

Six minutes

14.76

12.92

16.7

Nine minutes

14.29

12.47

16.09

Fifteen minutes

12.96

11.08

14.76

Thirty minutes

13.61

11.35

15.73

Figure 2: 90% Probability Intervals Using
Bayesian Analysis.
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Interpretation was done through
examination of the plots and data. Again, there
is no overlap in the intervals except at the
baseline, where this is expected. The Gibbs
sampling technique used produces a baseline
estimation, making it possible to give a
probability interval for this as well as for the
repeated measurement points. The results for
estimating the mean change of ROM are very
similar to the GLM results but the probability
intervals are smaller than the confidence
intervals and none of the probability intervals,
other than the baseline, contains zero. The
Bayesian analysis, like the general linear model,
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assumes random sampling, normally distributed
raw scores for the subjects and a linear
relationship between scores and group and time
variables. It also makes the important
assumption of a non-informative prior.
Comparison of Analyses
In this simple example the conclusions
reached with both analytical techniques appear
quite similar in terms of clinical interpretation of
results and related treatment planning. With this
data set and a non-informative prior this is not
surprising. Both types of analyses would lead to
the practical clinical conclusion that the stretch
altered range of motion for at least thirty
minutes. In addition there was the expected
observation that the repeated measurements did
have an effect on ROM, albeit a smaller effect
than stretch and measurement combined.
There are, however, some key
differences in the interpretation of the results. In
the frequentist analysis, the null hypotheses that
were no differences in the mean change of ROM
is rejected. This conclusion can be reached
through the 90% confidence intervals for the
mean change without considering any previous
information about the mean change. On the
other hand, in Bayesian analysis, the distribution
of the mean change was estimated and the
likelihood of the mean change in terms of the
probability intervals calculated. With Bayesian
analysis, it is allowed to utilize the previous
knowledge about the distribution of parameters.
There are a few differences apparent
that may lead to a preference for the Bayesian
analysis for this study. The data set is small and
does violate some of the assumptions behind the
general linear model with repeated measures
used in the frequentist analysis. The effect of
this is to weaken faith in the conclusions.
The 90% confidence intervals with the
general linear model are also wider in all but the
one minute measurement in the experimental
group analysis than the corresponding Bayesian
90% probability intervals. The width of
confidence intervals in conventional analysis
gives an estimate of precision with narrower
widths desirable (Brooks, 2003). None of the
post-baseline Bayesian probability intervals
includes zero while two of the frequentist
confidence intervals do in the control group,
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despite an anticipated measurement effect. The
smaller intervals in the Bayesian analysis reflect
the strength of the sampling procedure and its
ability to deal with small data sets. The Bayesian
results are more compatible with clinical
expectations based on muscle stretching
theories. For these reasons the authors conclude
that the Bayesian analysis seems to be the better
analysis option with this particular data set.
There are additional advantages for a
clinician who wants to continue data collection
on stretching techniques but lacks facilities for
large scale experimentation. The posterior
distributions determined from this study could
be used as informed priors in subsequent
research, refining estimates and improving
accuracy with additional data collection. This
approach mimics the classic model of scientific
reasoning. Assuming the clinician has access to
computing resources and programs for Bayesian
analysis, a series of small clinical studies could
incrementally add to the body of research on the
subject. The reasoning process in Bayesian
analysis also has its attractions. Ashby and
Smith (2000) argue that the Bayesian approach
is the natural one for use in evidence-based
practice where information must be synthesized
and used in individual decision-making.
Conclusion
As computing power increases and statistical
packages become more readily available and
usable, Bayesian analysis may be seen more
often in the medical and health literature used to
guide clinical practice. It is now not uncommon
to see articles in clinical journals that use
Bayesian analysis either alone or in combination
with frequentist analysis. This article gives an
illustration of Bayesian and classical analysis
applied to a simple clinical problem and the
interpretation of results. In the example used, the
authors concluded that they would prefer the
Bayesian approach for analysis. Future studies
such as simulating the power of two types of
analysis in detecting the mean change of ROM
would help clinicians understand the advantage
of using classical statistics and Bayesian
statistics.
Whatever approach is used in data
analysis, it is important to recognize that there is
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more than one approach. Bayesian analysis is
being used in clinical studies to guide practice.
In this paper Bayesian and frequentist statistical
approaches are used to analyze a sample data set
in order to contrast the two approaches and
make clinicians aware of different approaches to
data analysis.
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